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COMMENTARY 
PRIVATE TRUSTS FOR INDEFINITE 
BENEFICIARIES 
George E. Palmer* 
R ECENTLY, in McPhail v. Doulton (In re Baden's Deed Trusts),1 the House of Lords reached a decision that marks an important 
change in the English law of trusts which could be important also 
for American law. It held that there is a single test of validity for pri-
vate trusts and for powers of appointment where the issue is whether 
the beneficiaries of the trust or the objects of the power are suffi-
ciently definite, and that this single test is that applicable to powers 
of appointment. For nearly 170 years, since the decision in Morice 
v. Bishop of Durham,2 English law has had a stricter test of 
validity for a trust than for a power, and the same has been true in 
virtually all American jurisdictions.8 For private trusts in which the 
beneficiaries are designated by some group description, the settled 
rule has been that the trust fails unless the entire class of benefici-
aries is capable of ascertainment. This has been true even though the 
trustee is given a power of selection from within the group, so that 
through the exercise of the power the beneficiaries would in fact be 
defined or identified. This test was thought to be settled for English 
law by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Inland Revenue Com-
missioners v. Broadway Cottages Trust, where the court said that "a 
trust for such members of a given class of objects as the trustees shall 
select is void for uncertainty, unless the whole range of objects eligi-
ble for selection is ascertained or capable of ascertainment .... "4 
In contrast, it became established in English law that this test 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1930, J.D. 1932, University of 
Michigan; LL.M. 1940, Columbia University. Editorial :Board, Vol. 30, Michigan Law 
Review.-Ed. 
1. [1971] A.C. 424 (1970). See Harris, Trust, Power and Duty, 87 LAw Q. REv. 31 
(1971); Hopkins, Certain Uncertainties of Trusts and Powers, 1971 CAMn. L.J. 68; 1970 
CAMB, L.J. 206; 33 Moo. L. R.Ev. 686 (1970) for discussions of the case. 
2. IO Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (Ch. 1805). 
3. See Palmer, The Effect of Indefiniteness on the Validity of Trusts and Powers 
of Appointment, IO UCLA L. R.Ev. 241 (1963), for an extensive discussion of both 
English and American law. 
The term "private trust" is used to describe any trust that cannot be sustained as 
a charitable trust. Indefiniteness of beneficiaries or purposes does not affect the validity 
of a charitable trust. E.g., Vidal v. Girard's Bers., 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844). 
4. (1955] Ch. 20, 35-36 (C.A. 1954). Earlier decisions of the Chancery Division had 
announced the same rule. In re Ogden, [1933] Ch. 678; In re Gestetner Settlement, (1953] 
Ch. 672, 
[ 359] 
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would be applied only where the trustee was under a duty to make 
the selection, that is, to exercise his power of distribution or appoint-
ment. If he was not, if the exercise of the power was optional with 
him, validity was to be determined by the rule applicable to powers 
of appointment, and this was less stringent.5 In recent years a few 
English judges have expressed dissatisfaction with this distinction6 
and the House of Lords has now rejected it in Baden's Trusts. A 
trust for a class of beneficiaries will no longer fail because it is not 
possible to determine the entire membership of the class. The con-
trolling opinion in the House of Lords was written by Lord Wilber-
force, who concluded that the trust rule should be assimilated to 
that previously adopted for powers of appointment under which the 
disposition is valid "if it can be said with certainty that any given 
individual is or is not a member of the class."7 The decision was by 
a divided court; two judges concurred with Lord Wilberforce while 
two others dissented on the ground that the validity of a trust should 
continue to be governed by the rule formulated in the Broadway 
Cottages case. 
In American law nearly all jurisdictions have had a stricter test 
for trusts than for powers of appointment. Our courts have deter-
mined the validity of a trust by the same test formulated in the 
Broadway Cottages case: the trust is valid only if the entire member-
ship of the class is capable of ascertainment. This is true even though 
the trustee has been given a power of selection from within the class, 
provided he is under a duty to exercise the power.8 If the trustee is 
not under such a duty, the validity of his power presumably will be 
5. Wishaw v. Stephens, [1970] A.C. 508 (1968), affg. In re Gulbenkian's Settlements, 
[1968] 1 Ch. 126 (C.A. 1967); In re Gestetner Settlement, [1953] Ch. 672. 
6. Lord Denning, the present Master of the Rolls, was of the opinion that the de-
cision in Broadway Cottages was contrary to common sense and should be "brought 
into line" with the rule governing powers of appointment. In re Gulbenkian's Settle-
ments, [1968] 1 Ch. 126, 133 (C.A. 1967). In In re Hain's Settlement, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 
440, 445 (C.A.), Lord Evershed, Master of the Rolls, found the distinction "logically un-
attractive." When Baden's Trusts was in the Court of Appeal, Justice Harman expressed 
the opinion that the distinction between trust and power "ought to make no difference 
to the deed's validity and that it does is an absurd and embarrassing result • • • ." 
[1969] 2 Ch. 388, 397 (C.A.). 
7. [1971] A.C. at 456. 
8. Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891). In the first Rl:Si'ATEMENT OF 
TRusrs § 122 (1935), it was said that members of an indefinite class could not be bene-
ficiaries of a trust, and in comment a a class was described as indefinite "if the iden-
tity of all the individuals comprising its membership is not ascertainable." Nor was 
the trust saved in such a case, according to comment c, because the trustee was given a 
power of selection from the class. 
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determined by the rules pertaining to powers of appointment, and 
if by such rules the power is valid the accompanying trust is also 
valid.9 The test of validity of a power of appointment is that found 
in the Restatement of Property, which upholds a power if "the group 
is so described that some persons might reasonably be said to an-
swer the description ... .''10 It is not necessary that the entire mem-
bership of the group be ascertainable; as said in the Restatement, 
the "fact that the group is so large that its members could not be the 
beneficiaries of a trust . . . does not prevent them from being the 
objects of a power.''11 
If, for example, property is bequeathed to X for life, with 
power to appoint the remainder to such of the testator's friends as X 
shall select, and in default of appointment to B, the power of ap-
pointment is valid under the Restatement of Property.12 If the prop-
erty is given to a trustee to pay the income to X for life, with power 
in the trustee to appoint the remainder in the same manner and 
with the same gift in default, the power is still valid and the trust 
is therefore effective as intended. But if the power given the trustee 
is regarded as imperative-and this is the usual construction where 
there is no express gift in default-the power is in trust, is governed 
by trust rules, and is invalid under those rules because the bene-
ficiaries are indefinite.13 The reason usually given for such invalidity 
is that there is no one to enforce the trustee's duty to exercise the 
power. This conclusion has been under attack by writers since the 
time of Ames' initial criticism in 1892.14 Ames and others argued 
9. On this point the American cases are somewhat inconclusive, although it is be-
lieved that the disposition will be upheld if the trustee is under no duty to exercise 
the power. The cases which have invalidated a trust for indefiniteness of beneficiaries 
have emphasized that the trustee's power to dispose among the beneficiaries was im-
perative, and the implication is that the disposition would have been upheld had it 
been found that he was under no duty to exercise the power. Clark v. Campbell, 82 
N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891). The 
English decisions provide more satisfactory support for the validity of the trust. See 
note 5 supra and Palmer, supra note 3, at 262, for the English cases. 
10. REs'I'ATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 323, comment h at 1843 (1940). Accord, In re 
Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P.2d 781 (1952). 
11. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 323, comment h at 1843 (1940). 
12. Accord, In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz, 337, 241 P .2d 781 (1952). Under the 
standard rule of construction, the express gift in default means that the special power is 
not imperative. 
13. The leading case to this effect is Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 
(1926). 
14. Ames, The Failure of the "Tilden Trust", 5 HARV. L. R.Ev. 389 (1892); Scott, 
Control of Property by the Dead, 65 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 527 (1917); A. ScotT, TRUSTS §§ 122, 
123 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter A. ScoIT]; Palmer, supra note 3. 
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that the absence of anyone to enforce the trustee's duty should not 
invalidate his power. In essence, the trustee should be permitted to 
exercise the power as the donor intended. 
The position just described was adopted in 1959 in the Second 
Restatement of Trusts, by applying to trusts the test used in deter-
mining the validity of a power of appointment. Under this reformu-
lation of doctrine, a bequest in trust for an indefinite class of persons 
is valid unless "the class is so indefinite that it cannot be ascertained 
whether any person falls within it."15 Stated differently, the disposi-
tion is valid if it is possible to determine with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that some person answers the class description. The general 
objective is much the same as that accomplished in Baden's Tmsts; as 
Lord Wilberforce put it, "to assimilate the validity test for trusts to 
that which applies to powers."16 So far, however, the objective has not 
been accomplished in American law. During the thirteen years since 
the issuance of the Second Restatement, no court seems to have 
adopted the Restatement position; the only decisions found have 
adhered to the traditional view.17 For American law the principal im-
portance of Baden's Trusts is that it may lead courts to rethink the 
trust problem and assimilate the trust rule concerning validity to that 
accepted for powers of appointment. Should this occur, however, our 
courts should not adopt the test of validity established by the House 
of Lords. 
15. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusrs § 122 (1959). In section 123 an analogous rule 
is adopted to cover trusts for indefinite purposes: the bequest is effective unless "the 
purpose is so indefinite that it cannot be ascertained whether any application falls 
within it." See text accompanying notes 39-45 infra for a discussion of this second type 
of trust. 
16. [1971] A.C. at 450. While this is the general objective of the Restatement, it 
refuses to call the arrangement a trust, presumably because there is no one to enforce 
the trustee's duty. This is in fundamental conflict with the position of the Restate-
ment that there can be a valid trust for unborn beneficiaries. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSI'S § 112, illustration 6 at 245 (1959). See Palmer, supra note 3, at 281-85. 
17. In Armington v. Meyer, 103 R.I. 211, 213, 236 A.2d 450, 452 (1967), a testamen-
tary trust provided that certain income should be distributed "by my trustee[s] afore-
said at their discretion and will for the benefit of ••• all men and women among my 
employees and acquaintances known to my said trustees to have been loyal to me 
and my inventions during the hard, up-hill struggle to establish my ••• business." 
This was held invalid for lack of an ascertainable class of beneficiaries. In Estate of 
Kradwell, 44 Wis. 2d 40, 42, 170 N.W .2d 773, 774 (1969), a will bequeathed the residuary 
estate to the executrix "to distribute the same to and among my heirs, named legatees, 
and such other persons she may deem deserving and for benevolent objects, and to such 
of them and in such proportion as she shall deem just and proper . • .. " It was held 
that the bequest was in trust and that the trust failed because "the beneficiaries are 
uncertain and no one is in a position to enforce the trust." 44 Wis. 2d at 45, 170 N.W .2d 
at 775. 
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I. THE TEST OF VALIDITY 
About a year before the decision in Baden's Trusts, the House 
of Lords made a definitive statement concerning the test to be used 
in determining whether a power of appointment is valid. In Gulben-
kian' s Settlements it held that "a mere or bare power of appointment 
among a class is valid if you can with certainty say whether any given 
individual is or is not a member of the class; you do not have to be 
able to ascertain every member of the class."18 The power in that 
case was held by the trustee of an express trust who had authority 
to distribute income within a class which probably was too indefinite 
to satisfy the trust rule announced in the Broadway Cottages case. 
The court held in Gulbenkian that the trustee was under no duty 
to exercise the power, that validity was to be determined by the rule 
applicable to powers rather than that applicable to trusts, and that 
the power satisfied the test quoted above. In Baden's Trusts the 
House of Lords was confronted with a similar case except that the 
trustee was under a duty to exercise the power, hence validity was 
governed by the law of trusts. The trust provided for distribution 
of income to employees and former employees of a certain company, 
as well as "relatives or dependents of any such persons,"19 with dis-
cretion in the trustees to select the distributees from this group and 
to determine the amounts they were to receive. As has been seen, the 
court held that the test of validity established for powers was to gov-
ern trusts as weU.20 
This test of validity is much narrower than that adopted in our 
law for powers of appointment and that proposed in the Second 
Restatement of Trusts for adoption with respect to trusts. The essen-
tial difference is that under the English rule a court must be able 
to determine (with certainty, the court says21) whether any given 
person is or is not a member of the class, whereas under the Ameri-
can rule pertaining to powers it is sufficient if the court can deter-
18. [1970] A.C. 508, 521 (1968). See 1969 CAMB. L.J. 30, for a discussion of the case. 
Any doubt that the court was promulgating this as the test of validity of a power was 
set at rest in Baden's Trust, [1971] A.C. at 450. 
19. [1971] A.C. at 428. 
20. There was no decision on whether the designation of beneficiaries satisfied the 
trust test formulated in Broadway Cottages. :Because of the manner in which the case 
reached the House of Lords, all of the judges were agreed that it must be returned to 
the trial court for decision on the issue of validity. The difference between the majority 
and the dissenting judges was over the test to be applied in deciding that issue. 
21. The certainty requirement is unwise and seems bound to produce unnecessary 
litigation, but that is a problem for the English courts to deal with. 
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mine with a reasonable degree of certainty that there is a person who 
satisfies the class description. The English rule is destructively nar-
row, it had no support in English decisions until recent times, and 
it has no support in the American decisions. While it would be well 
for our courts to follow the lead of the House of Lords in testing the 
validity of a private trust by the rule developed for powers of ap-
pointment, the powers rule to be followed is that now found in the 
Restatements of Property and Trusts. 
To illustrate the difference, assume a testamentary trust in which 
the trustee is given power to dispose of the trust assets to such of the 
friends of the testator as he selects. The disposition would be effec-
tive under the Second Restatement of Trusts since the test is whether 
there is some person who "might reasonably be said to answer the 
description,''22 and the meaning of friendship is surely precise 
enough for this purpose. In contrast, under the English decisions 
the power and the trust will be valid only if it can be said with cer-
tainty whether any given person is or is not a friend. It is doubtful 
that the meaning of friendship is definite enough to meet this test; 
if not, both the trust and the power will fail. There is no sensible 
reason for such a result. If X clearly was a friend and the trustee 
disposes of the property to him, why should the appointment fail 
merely because it cannot be said with certainty whether Y was or 
was not a friend? If an appointment is made to Y and a court is 
unable to say with reasonable ~ertainty that Y was a friend, the 
appointment will be ineffective, but that is not a sufficient reason 
for invalidating the power. 
The test of validity of a power of appointment which the House 
of Lords adopted in the Gulbenkian case had not appeared during 
some five centuries of development of the English law of powers. 
It was first announced by Justice Harman in 1953 when he sat in 
the Chancery Division,28 and was subsequently followed in other 
decisions of that court.24 When the Gulbenkian case was in the Court 
of Appeal, Lord Denning (who is notable among English judges for 
his dislike of decisions which contradict common sense) suggested 
a test of validity for powers of appointment much like that formu-
22. REsTATEMENT OF PROl'ERTY § 323, comment h at 1843 (1940). The language from 
the Restatement of Property is used because it is more felicitous than that found in 
the corresponding portion of the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tousrs § 122 (1959). 
23. In re Gestetner Settlement, [1953] Ch. 672. 
24. See Palmer, supra note 3, at 255-57, for a discussion of the Gestetner case on this 
point; id. at 256 for a list of other cases to the same effect. 
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lated in the Restatement of Property,25 but the House of Lords re-
jected his opinion.26 
II. ENFORCEMENT OF A TRUST FOR INDEFINITE BENEFICIARIES 
In his opinion in Baden's Trusts Lord Wilberforce took another 
position which could have important consequences for English and 
American law. Contrary to received opinion, he concluded that in 
proper circumstances a court will enforce a trust for indefinite bene-
ficiaries if the trustee fails to perform his duty to dispose of the 
property among such beneficiaries. This is a significant departure 
from established doctrine which our courts might well accept. 
In criticizing the rule that a trust for indefinite beneficiaries is 
ineffective, Ames and his followers have argued that the trust in-
cludes a power of appointment which the trustee is under a duty to 
exercise, and that the power should not fail merely because the duty 
is unenforceable.27 The assumption has always been that there is 
no means of enforcing the trustee's fiduciary duty, so that if he fails 
to exercise the power there will come a time when the court will 
declare a resulting trust in favor of those entitled to take in default 
of appointment. This is the position taken in the Second Restate-
ment of Trusts, which says that a bequest in trust for an indefinite 
class of beneficiaries does not create an "enforceable trust" but does 
give the trustee a power of disposition when he is "authorized or 
directed to convey the property to such members of the class as he 
may select."28 
The view that the trustee's duty to distribute is unenforceable 
25. In re Gulbenkian's Settlements, [1968] I Ch. 126, 134 (C.A. 1967): 
[I]f there is some particular person at hand, of whom you can say that he is fairly 
and squarely within the class intended to be benefited, then the clause is good. 
You should not hold it to be bad simply because you can envisage borderline 
cases in which it would be difficult to say whether or no a person was within the 
class. 
Lord Denning also was of the opinion that Broadway Cottages should be overruled and 
the trust rule of validity "brought into line" with the rule he had formulated for 
powers. [1968] 1 Ch. at 133. 
26. The controlling opinion in the House of Lords was written by Lord Upjohn, and 
his discussion of Denning's test of validity appears in [1970] A.C. at 525. 
27. See authorities cited in note 14 supra. 
28. RFsrATEMENT (SF.CoND) OF TRUsrs § 122 (1959). In comment d at 257 it is said 
that "no member of the class can maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust, nor can 
any other person maintain such a proceeding." 
Section 122 is limited to a case in which the trustee has what is termed an exclusive 
power in the law of powers; that is, a power to appoint to only certain members of the 
group and exclude the others. There is a brief discussion of the significance of this 
limitation in Palmer, supra note 3, at 280 n.182. 
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had also been taken for granted in English law until the decision in 
Baden's Trusts. In that case Lord Wilberforce asserted that if the 
trustee fails to exercise the power the court will exercise it "in the 
manner best calculated to give effect to the settlor's or testator's in-
tentions."29 As to the manner in which that could be done, he sug-
gested that a new trustee might be appointed; or that persons within 
the class of beneficiaries might be authorized or directed to "prepare 
a scheme of distribution," presumably to be presented to the court 
for approval; or finally, that the court itself might prepare such a 
scheme "should the proper basis for distribution appear . . . ."80 
Although he did not discuss who would have standing to initiate 
action seeking enforcement, it seems reasonably clear that a person 
within the described class would qualify. 
The reason for the development of the requirement that the en-
tire membership of the class be ascertainable has been the belief that 
the only manner in which the court can order distribution when the 
trustee fails to exercise his power is through distribution equally 
among the class. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, it 
has been taken for granted in both English and American law 
that a court will not assert power to dispose of the property in 
any other manner.81 There were English decisions during the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries in which courts did order some 
other form of distribution, but since Eldon's time these have been 
regarded as obsolete. The view became settled that the discretion 
was given only to the trustee and could not be exercised by the 
court, hence the only means by which the court could order distribu-
tion without exercising the trustee's discretion would be through 
29. [1971] A.C. at 457. 
30. [1971] A.C. at 457. 
31. In Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 561, 32 Eng. Rep. 473 (Ch. 1803), a testamentary 
trustee was directed to dispose of certain property to such of the children of X as he 
should select, with no express gift in default, and the trustee died before the will took 
effect. It was held that the property went to the entire class in equal shares. Writers 
on the law of powers have disagreed as to the theory of decision, and Lord Eldon did 
not rest his decision on any single theory. He did say, however, that "wherever a trust 
is created, and the execution of that trust fails by the death of the trustee, • • • this 
court will execute the trust." 8 Ves. at 570, 32 Eng. Rep. at 476. But the extent of such 
"execution" was a decree for equal distribution. Two years earlier, in Kemp v. Kemp, 
5 Ves. 849, 859, 31 Eng. Rep. 891, 896 (Ch. 1801), the Master of the Rolls referred to 
Warburton v. Warburton, 4 Bro. P.C. 1, 2 Eng. Rep. 1 (H.L. 1702), as an "extraordinary" 
decision in which the court exercised the trustee's power. He observed that "of late the 
Court has disclaimed" such authority; instead, it will "give the fund equally." The 
Warburton case is one of those relied on by Lord Wilberforce in Baden's Trusts. See 
note 33 infra. 
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equal distribution among all members of the class. In order to do 
this, the entire membership of the class must be ascertained. The 
result was that a trust for an indefinite class of beneficiaries could 
not be enforced, and therefore was not valid, since the general posi-
tion in both English and American law has been that validity turns 
on whether a court can enforce performance of the trustee's duties.32 
In Baden's Trusts, the House of Lords rejected the self-imposed 
limitation on the exercise of judicial power which developed after 
1800 and returned to the earlier decisions,33 where it found a still 
viable principle "that a discretionary trust can, in a suitable case, be 
executed according to its merits and otherwise than by equal divi-
sion."34 
This conclusion made it possible to uphold a trust in which the 
entire class of beneficiaries is not ascertainable, without departing 
from the position that validity depends on enforceability, a position 
that Lord Wilberforce assumed for purposes of decision.35 It would 
32. This was settled for English law by Morice v. Bishop of Durham, IO Ves. 
522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (Ch. 1805); Vezey v. Jamson, 1 Sim. &: Stu. 69, 57 Eng. Rep. 27 
(1822). The two most important American decisions are Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 
28 N.E. 880 (1891) and Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926). The honorary 
trust is an exception. A. Scorr, supra note 14, § 124. 
33. In Moseley v. Moseley, [1673] Fin. 53, 23 Eng. Rep. 28, 29, a will directed the ex-
ecutors to hold land for fifteen years and then settle it on such one of the three sons 
of Nicholas "as they should think fit." When the executors failed to exercise the power, 
the court ordered them to do so "within a Fortnight," and if they failed "then this 
Court will nominate one of the three [sons]." 23 Eng. Rep. at 30. Other cases relied on 
by Wilberforce were Clarke v. Turner, [1694] Free Ch. 198, 22 Eng. Rep. 1158; Warbur-
ton v. Warburton, 4 Bro. P.C. 1, 2 Eng. Rep. I (H.L. 1702); Richardson v. Chapman, 7 
Bro. P.C. 318, 3 Eng. Rep. 206 (H.L. 1760). 
In addition to these cases Lord Wilberforce resurrected Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 
469, 26 Eng. Rep. 299 (1739), a decision which has been regarded as anomalous since 
Eldon's time. That case established that an imperative power of appointment among 
relatives of the donor is valid even though the class is not limited to heirs or next of 
kin and the entire membership therefore is not ascertainable. If the trustee or other 
holder of the power fails to make an appointment, courts have held that the property 
goes in default of appointment to the heirs or next of kin of the donor. This does not 
fit within general doctrine, first, because a trust for indefinite beneficiaries is held to be 
valid, and second, because on failure of the trustee to discharge his duty to make dis• 
tribution of the fund, courts have enforced distribution in favor of a smaller group than 
the entire class membership. Instead of treating this group of cases as anomalous 
Lord Wilberforce concluded that "a practice, or rule, which has been long followed 
and found useful in 'relations' cases" could also serve as a guide to decision in other 
types of cases. [1971] A.C. at 452. 
34. [1971] A.C. at 452 (emphasis original). 
35. His opinion contains the following passage: "Assuming, as I am prepared to do 
for present purposes, that the test of validity is whether the trust can be executed by 
the court, it does not follow that execution is impossible unless there is equal division." 
[1971] A.C. at 451. 
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be wise for American courts to accept his view that there are methods 
through which a trust for indefinite beneficiaries can be enforced.36 
This would make it possible to save most trusts which now fail 
without departing from the principle that validity depends on en-
forceability. 37 But the best hope for sensible development of our law 
is to reject this principle and follow the general course suggested in 
the Second Restatement of Trusts. At the same time, techniques for 
enforcement of the sort suggested in Baden's Trusts should be em-
ployed when enforcement is found to be desirable.38 
III. TRUSTS FOR INDEFINITE PURPOSES 
One of the principal casualties of the rule invalidating trusts for 
indefiniteness is the trust for benevolent purposes. Less than thirty 
years ago, in Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson,39 the House of 
Lords declared such a trust invalid after the trustees had distributed 
more than 200,000 pounds to various charitable and benevolent in-
stitutions. As a result the trustees became personally liable to the 
next of kin who were entitled to the money by way of resulting 
trust.40 The decision should have come as no surprise since essen-
tially the same sort of trust was held invalid in Morice v. Bishop 
of Durham,41 the case which has been the principal source of our 
36. In commenting on Baden's Trusts Professor Scott has written: 
I have been too ready to suggest that the disposition fails if the donee of the power 
fails to exercise it. It is more sensible to hold that, if this is necessary to effectuate 
the intention of the settlor, and if it is practicable, the court may take measures 
best calculated to see that a proper disposition is made, as Lord Wilberforce sug-
gests •.•• 
A. Scorr, supra note 14, § 122 (Supp. 1972). 
37. The suggested techniques for enforcement are not dependent on acceptance of 
the test of validity established in Baden's Trusts. They could be used with equal facility 
in conjunction with the test of validity adopted in the Restatements of Property and 
Trusts. 
38. The principal effect of Lord Wilberforce's suggestions concerning techniques for 
enforcement is that it enabled the court to establish a new test of trust validity while 
adhering to the view that a trust is valid only if the trustee's duty is enforceable. In the 
usual case in which an issue of validity is presented, the trustee is willing to carry out 
the trust and the question is whether he will be permitted to do so. He will be if the 
trust is upheld, and usually that will end the matter so far as the court is concerned. 
Enforcement of the trustee's duty becomes an issue only when he fails to perform it. 
39. [1944] A.C. 341. 
40. In re Diplock, [1948] Ch. 465, 503 (C.A.). 
41. 10 Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (Ch. 1805). The trust there was for "objects of 
benevolence and liberality," but the opinion made it reasonably clear that the trust 
would have been invalid had it been limited to benevolent purposes. This was ex-
plicitly decided in In re Jarman's Estate, 8 Ch. D. 584 (1878). 
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present rules relating to indefiniteness. The problem of indefinite-
ness has arisen in connection with two separable types of trusts, first, 
those in which beneficiaries are designated by some group term, and, 
second, those in which the uses to which the trust fund is to be put 
are described by reference to purposes. The first type of trust was 
involved in Baden's Trusts, whereas a trust for benevolent purposes 
is of the second variety. There is no reference to the Diocesan Fund 
case in the opinions in Baden's Trusts, nor is there any suggestion 
as to the effect of the decision on such a "purpose" trust. 
Only time will tell whether the decision will have any effect on 
the validity of various types of purpose trusts which in the past have 
been held invalid under English law.42 It would seem that the tech-
niques for enforcement suggested by Lord Wilberforce are adapta-
ble to a trust for benevolent purposes or any other stated purpose. 
I£ so, validity could be made to depend on whether a court can say 
with certainty that any given use of the fund either does or does not 
come within the stated purpose. This test would lead to the rejection 
of some relatively recent decisions in which trusts for specific or 
relatively specific purposes have been struck down; for example, a 
trust established by George Bernard Shaw to carry on specific proj-
ects connected with the development of a new English alphabet.43 
Arguably also, the test could lead to the validation of a trust for 
benevolent purposes; but that is a closer question, and in any event 
it is improbable that the House of Lords intended to disturb a deci-
sion as firmly settled as that in the Diocesan Fund case.44 
For American law the application to trusts of the rule of validity 
that obtains for powers would mean the overruling of decisions 
which have denied effect to trusts for benevolent purposes. This has 
not yet occurred, but it would occur if our courts accepted the Eng-
42. See Harris, supra note I; Hopkins, supra note I. 
43. In re Shaw, [1957] I W.L.R. 729 (Ch.). See also In re Astor's Settlement Trusts, 
[1952] Ch. 534. Even before the decision in Baden's Trusts there was some uncertainty 
as to the meaning and scope of these decisions. There has been some suggestion of a 
distinction between a trust which contemplates disposition for the benefit of persons 
or institutions, and a trust in which the fund would be used for a specified purpose 
without such a disposition. Honorary trusts such as those for the care of animals are 
of the latter type, and the inclination has been to treat them as anomalous, to be 
strictly limited. In re Denley's Trust Deed, [1969] I Ch. 373 (1968). 
44. In In- re Endacott, [1960] Ch. 232, 250, Harman, L.J., expressed the view that 
nothing should be done to upset "the whole structure so elaborately built up and, one 
had hoped after Diplack's case, so firmly established." The reference is to the Diocesan 
Fund case, which was entitled In re Diplock in the Court of Appeal, [1941] Ch. 253 
(C.A.). But cf. Re Wootton's Will Trusts, (1968] 2 All E.R. 618 (Ch.). 
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lish assimilation of the two rules while adhering to our own test of 
the validity of powers.46 
45. The trust in Baden's Trusts was established by the settlor during his lifetime, 
but the attack on the trust did not occur until after his death. It was taken for granted 
that on the issue of validity it made no difference whether the trust was inter vivos or 
testamentary, and indeed there is no persuasive reason why it should make a difference. 
Nonetheless, the Second Restatement of Trusts draws a sharp distinction between the 
two types of trust. The rules heretofore discussed apply only to testamentary trusts; in 
contrast, it is said that an inter vivos trust for indefinite beneficiaries or purposes creates 
merely a revocable agency which is revoked by the death of the settlor. In section 122 
covering indefinite beneficiaries, comment h says that an inter vivos trust is governed 
by section 419, and the same is said in section 123, comment h, as to trusts for indefinite 
purposes. The revocable agency analysis is adopted in section 419. Had the House of 
Lords accepted this notion it would never have reached the issues which in fact it 
undertook to decide. There is no sense or principle to the Restatement distinction and 
no case has been found which supports it. This treatment of inter vivos trusts is dis• 
cussed critically in Palmer, supra note 3, at 284-85. None of the cases cited in A. Scarr, 
supra note 14, § 419, supports the revocable agency analysis. The decision in Baden's 
Trusts is useful authority in opposition to the distinction. 
